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Introduction
Growing antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is one of
the most significant public health threats in modern
times. It is estimated that AMR leads to approximately
23,000 deaths in the US and 25,000 deaths in the
European Union (EU).1 New treatments to address
this growing resistance are urgently needed, yet the
pipeline of novel antibiotics is extremely limited.2 If
the current increase in AMR rates continues and new
tools to combat AMR are not developed, the health
and economic burden on society could be significant.3
There is increasing global attention to AMR at the
United Nations, World Health Organization, G7 and
G20, World Economic Forum, and OECD. The pharmaceutical industry has also made commitments to
address AMR.4 These groups have all recognized the
need for new incentives to facilitate increased antibiotic R&D as well as to enable availability and access to
innovative antibiotics to treat AMR. Given the global
diversity of health systems and types of antibiotics
required, our perspective is that these incentives will
likely need to be tailored to the local context and priorities; there is no one-size-fits-all solution to address
the multi-level challenges of antimicrobial innovation.

Reasons for Uncertain Return on Investment
for Novel Antibiotics
The reasons for the decline in antibiotic research and
development (R&D) are manifold, including scientific5 and regulatory6 challenges, as well as limited
returns for novel antibiotics7 once approved.
With regards to the economic challenges, firstly, novel
antibiotics are generally undervalued by reimbursement systems relative to their societal value and public health benefits as Health Technology Assessment
(HTA) agencies do not fully recognize these elements in
current assessment frameworks.8 The antibiotics market is dominated by generic products, which are considered to be effective for the majority of patients who
are not infected by resistant pathogens. To facilitate
antibacterial development and enable feasible development of new agents that can proactively address emerging resistance before it is widespread, regulators accept
non-inferiority clinical trial designs for approval decisions for novel antibiotics. This means that clinical differentiation versus standard of care, a key requirement
to achieve favorable benefit assessments by European
HTA agencies and hospitals, is difficult, which negatively impacts pricing and reimbursement negotiations.
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Secondly, once they have received marketing authorization, novel antibiotics are generally used sparingly
to preserve effectiveness, particularly since infections
caused by resistant bacteria may be initially rare.
There is often limited availability/use of diagnostics and limited local surveillance data on resistance
to guide clinical decision making regarding antibiotic treatment choice. Additionally, reimbursement
systems can restrict or discourage the use of newer
medicines. Antibiotics used to treat serious infections
in the hospital setting are generally funded through
Diagnostic Related Groups (DRGs) both in Europe
and the US. DRGs are lump sum payments and can
vary considerably depending on the primary patient
diagnosis for which the hospital is reimbursed. As the
DRG payments are constant and meant to reimburse
for all procedures related to a particular diagnosis,
including drug costs, hospitals are unable to recuperate costs when using novel and costly antibiotics. This
often results in significant restrictions by hospitals
when making formulary listing decisions and patients
may be denied early and appropriate treatment due to
budget constraints.
And finally, there are additional challenges with
estimating the market size due to considerable uncertainty associated with predicting the rates at which
multi-drug resistance will arise.9
All of these factors contribute to limited and uncertain returns for new antibiotics relative to other
therapeutic areas and declining private investment
in antibiotic R&D.10 To address these challenges, governments have recognized the need to put policies
in place that: (1) promote sustainable investment in
innovation to combat AMR and provide a competitive return on investment; and (2) drive appropriate
use, making novel antibiotics available to patients who
need them, while also preserving their effectiveness
for future patients.

Potential Actions to Stimulate Antibiotic
R&D
Renwick et al.11 provide a systematic review of available literature and have identified 46 unique incentive
strategies that were designed to potentially stimulate
antibiotic R&D. As expected, all models have their
pros and cons and some additionally rely on sustainable sources of funding.
Several groups, including DRIVE-AB,12 the AMR
Review, 13 Chatham House, 14 Boston Consulting
Group,15 the pharmaceutical industry,16 and others17
have attempted multi-dimensional approaches to
evaluate innovative economic solutions that may provide appropriate incentives for stakeholders to invest
in antibiotic R&D.
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Common recommendations in these reviews
include: additional “push” funding (e.g., grants, tax
credits) to directly cover the cost of antimicrobial
R&D combined with some form of de-linked “pull”
mechanism (e.g., Market Entry Reward, transferable
exclusivity, insurance models) to reward developers
for successfully bringing a new product to market.
These novel de-linked “pull” mechanisms reduce the
proportion of developer revenue/return derived from
antibiotic sales volume and may decrease payer and
developer uncertainty. In some cases these incentives
would require significant changes to current reimbursement systems or new systems to establish eligibility and the magnitude of the de-linked payment.18
Such incentives could be useful to reduce developer
uncertainty for antibiotics targeting pre-defined resistance profiles that could emerge over time and have
very low expected use. However, they may not be
appropriate for stimulating R&D for all types of antibiotics. These models reduce developer uncertainty by
shifting risk to the payer, which must accurately predict resistance patterns and future innovation needs.
This is no easy task. If these predictions are incorrect,
de-linked incentives could fund innovation that is not
well aligned to future needs. To a certain extent, these
challenges may be mitigated by the implementation
of partially de-linked models, where some proportion
of developer revenue is still derived from unit-based
sales. This lowers the upfront financial commitment
and risk to payers, works within existing reimbursement systems, and enables health market dynamics
to facilitate competition and encourage innovation
through differentiation.
Some of these reviews on antibiotic incentives19
have recognized the benefits of other incentive mechanisms, including those that could work within the
structure of current health care systems. Some key
examples of these types of incentives are described
below: reimbursement reform, value-based pricing,
and value assessment reform.
Reimbursement Reform
The current Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG)-based
hospital reimbursement system in the U.S. and most
of Europe imposes a significant economic constraint
on antibiotics used to treat serious infections in the
hospital settings. As mentioned previously, DRGs provide a set payment to hospitals for a given patient diagnosis, encompassing labor and non-labor costs including pharmaceuticals. This often results in significant
restrictions on the more expensive novel antibiotics by
hospitals when making formulary listing decisions as
the cost of these expensive products may not be fully
covered by the DRG payments. As a result, patients
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may be denied early and appropriate treatment, which
has been shown to reduce morbidity and mortality,20
due to budgetary considerations. Reforms are needed
to reimburse the novel antibiotic separately from the
bundled payment. Several proposals have been made
in the US (DISARM Act) and Europe to implement
these changes.
Value-Based Pricing
Value-based pricing (VBP) models for medicines are
risk-sharing arrangements intended to align pricing and/or payments for medicines to the benefits
they provide to patients and health care systems. An
example of VBP models is indication-based arrangements when benefits vary significantly across patient
segments (e.g., different indications for the same
medicine or personalized medicines). Another is performance-based risk-sharing arrangements when the
potential outcomes of the medicine in the real-world
setting are uncertain (e.g., due to accelerated approvals, or difficulty in predicting which patients are likely
to respond). VBP could be an attractive solution for
antibiotics because of the potential to structure incentives to promote stewardship while creating reasonable commercial return to antibiotics R&D.21 It also
maintains current market-based forces and competition between companies with new antibiotics to drive
innovation, as the prices charged per antibiotic are
set independently. Specific proposals on VBP models
include a dual-pricing model (Diagnosis Confirmation Model22) and a population-based model (Priority
Antimicrobial Value and Entry Award23).
Value Assessment Reform
Reform to the current value assessment methodology is fundamental to enable successful implementation of the above models since the size of the rewards
(delinked models) or prices (value-based pricing)
should be commensurate with the benefits that antibiotics bring to the patients, health care systems, and
society. The value of novel antibiotics is under-recognized because certain societal values of antibiotics are
often not captured within current Health Technology Assessment (HTA) frameworks. In the European
AMR Action Plan24 that was launched in June 2017,
the European Commission committed to “develop
new or improved methodological HTA approaches
and foster methodological consensus-building.” Various researchers, including DRIVE-AB and the Office
of Health Economics,25 have recommended that the
unique attributes of novel antibiotics should be considered in reimbursement decision making, in a way
which captures the full range of benefits these important technologies bring to patients, the health care

system, and society. Otherwise, the value of these
essential medicines could continue to be substantially
under-recognized, leading to inadequate reward and
continuous declining innovation to address the rising
AMR problem. They propose that value assessments
for novel antibiotics include the following:
• A sensitivity analysis, as appropriate, of the
impact of resistance to the new antibiotic, both
initially and over time
• Population-level analysis
• Not only the direct costs and direct benefits
associated with treating one patient with an
antibiotic, where relevant, but also the following
benefits:
-- indirect benefits from avoided transmission
-- diversity benefits from the protective effects
on existing antibiotics currently in use26
DRIVE-AB found that some of these value elements
proposed have previously been discussed qualitatively by HTA bodies when evaluating antibiotics, but
are not yet formally captured via modelling.27 The
recommendations from this research and the call in
the EU AMR Action Plan create some momentum
for national HTA and reimbursement authorities in
Europe to begin to integrate these recommendations
into their value frameworks.

Different Solutions for Different Antibiotics
To best understand how different solutions are
needed, it is important to understand what factors
impact antibiotic use in clinical practice at the hospital level. The ultimate decision to treat with a particular antibiotic will likely depend on the type of
antibiotic (broad spectrum versus narrow spectrum/
pathogen specific antibiotics) being considered as well
as local MDR rates for the suspected pathogen(s). As
illustrated by Figure 1, an antibiotic is likely to be used
empirically only in cases where MDR rates in that setting (national, regional, local or even ward level) are
considered to be high. If the MDR rates are considered to be low, empiric use is less likely as there will be
situations where cheaper alternatives will be recommended to clinicians in guidelines while waiting for a
confirmatory MDR diagnosis, which currently takes
approximately 3-5 days. In situations, where MDR
rates are extremely low, use is likely to be severely
restricted as the antibiotic will only be used in emergency cases following confirmatory diagnosis or in
cases where all treatments have failed.
In those cases where resistance rates are low and/
or the incidence of the pathogen(s) is not considered
to be substantial, the likelihood of restricting use, only
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Figure 1
Antibiotic Use in Clinical Practice Depends on the Type of Antibiotics as well as Population Size

Notes: The definition of a “high”, “low” and “extremely low” MDR rate is likely to vary by jurisdiction. A “high” MDR rate generally refers to a rate
that leads to major cause for concern. A “low” MDR rate generally refers to a rate that does not result in hesitancy to wait for diagnostic confirmation prior to initiating a novel treatment unless a patient is severely ill and strongly suspected of an MDR infection. An “extremely low” MDR rate
generally refers to a rate that does not result in major cause for concern.
MDR = multi-drug resistance; 1L = first-line; 2L = second-line

Figure 2
The Range of Solutions Needed to Incentivize Antibiotic R&D and Reward Innovation
(R&D = research & development; 1L = first-line; 2L = second-line)
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in patients who are either confirmed or highly suspected of an MDR infection or fail prior lines of therapy, is greater. In such cases, especially those where
use is likely to be extremely low (emergency cases), a
de-linkage model may be an appropriate solution to
encourage investment.
In comparison, antibiotics that are used or expected
to be used in earlier lines of treatment (and result in a
sufficiently large patient population) are likely to generate substantially more revenue for pharmaceutical
manufacturers compared to antibiotics that are likely
to be used sparingly (in a small number of patients).
However, empiric use prior to diagnostic confirmation is likely to result in hospitals/payers having to
pay for the antibiotic even when used in those patients
who did not present with resistant strains. Therefore,
VBP models could be potential solutions to ensure
(1) appropriate and accountable stewardship and
(2) increased budget certainty for hospitals and payers.
We illustrate this approach in Figure 2, which
demonstrates how the system could move from the
status quo to a “range of solutions” to incentivize different types of antibiotics depending on the way in
which they are likely to be used in clinical practice (as
depicted in Figure 1; antibiotics expected to be used
in the empiric, confirmed/suspected or reserve/emergency setting).
Further consideration of the appropriate solution
may also be needed depending on the setting, e.g.,
developed versus low income countries, hospitals with
advanced infrastructure versus those with basic infrastructure etc.
As mentioned previously, it is difficult to forecast
the future market size for any antibiotic, including
market evolution over the product’s patent life, given
the difficulty associated with estimating the evolution of resistance with certainty. A prerequisite (and
complexity) of the Market Entry Reward model is
that it would require willing funder(s) and sustainable source(s) of funding several years in advance of
market entry to ensure that the incentive exists at the
time of development. It is important to maintain some
level of shared risk between governments/payers and
the pharmaceutical industry in order to drive continued innovation. In fully de-linked models, the public
sector assumes significant risk because it “picks winners” early, often before key characteristics of products
are fully understood or in absence of data on emerging resistance — this may not be optimal use of public
resources. The continued investment that comes with
partially de-linked, shared-risk models drives continued investment into new indications and the generation of more data on appropriate use of novel products.
Given that risks are not uniform across product life-

cycles/markets, the previously mentioned challenges
of setting eligibility criteria and reward sizes ex ante,
and concerns over the long-term funding sustainability, delinked incentives like Market Entry Rewards
may not be appropriate to reward innovation for all
types of antibiotics. Instead, through the additional
consideration of value based pricing as well as partial
de-linkage models, appropriate solutions can be fit to
different antibiotics while minimizing risk.

There Is No One-Size-Fits-All and a Range of
Incentives Is Needed
As described above, there are many challenges to the
sustainable investment in antimicrobial R&D. And
there are many different proposals to address these
challenges. From our perspective, there is no single
solution to incentivizing antibacterial innovation that
is suited to every country: a range of mechanisms that
are fit-for-purpose and designed to address specific
antibiotic market challenges is needed. These incentives should:
• Stimulate investment along the product life
cycle: A suite of both “push” and “pull” incentives will likely be needed to stimulate investment across the product life cycle. These should
be tailored to the context and political realities
of each region/country. For example, combined
together, a suite of incentives could reduce the
cost of clinical development (tax credits), provide
financial return early in the product life cycle
when use is expected to be low (Market Entry
Reward), and address barriers to appropriate
use and facilitate market-based incentive mechanisms (reimbursement reform).
• Account for health system differences: While
the global-level attention on AMR has been useful, solutions for incentivizing R&D and promoting appropriate use will likely come from the
local level. These delivery and incentive financing mechanisms will need to be well-integrated
into the health systems where antibiotics are
used. As countries have adopted many different
health care and financing systems, any single
incentive model is unlikely to be appropriate for
all settings or capable of resolving all antibiotic
R&D challenges.
• Incentivize different types of products: As discussed in the previous section, certain incentive
models may be more appropriate for different
types of antibiotics (broad vs pathogen-specific,
small vs. large population size). A wide range of
tools will be needed to address AMR and slow
the spread of resistance.
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It is unlikely that a “one size fits all” solution will be the way forward. Instead,
different solutions are needed depending on the type of antibiotic, the evolution
of resistance over time, likely use in clinical practice, and the health care setting
under consideration. Reforms are also needed to eliminate access barriers
associated with bundled payment mechanisms (DRGs) for novel antibiotics
that currently pose constraints on hospital budgets when making appropriate
treatment decisions. In addition, HTA authorities must continue the debate
on how to fully capture the societal value of novel antibiotics, which may not
be adequately captured within existing assessment framework. It is important
for policymakers, payers, and the medical community to collaborate in order to
address the current gaps in the market for antibiotics.
• Balance what can be implemented now within
existing systems vs. mid/long-term incentives:
Implementation of some of the novel “pull”
mechanisms may be complex and require major
modifications to current procurement and reimbursement structures, significant resource mobilization, and greater coordination across different stakeholders. Realistically, these changes
will take time and may only be implemented on
a mid- to long-term basis. Investment decisions
on R&D for tomorrow’s novel antibiotics are
being taken today. While novel incentive mechanisms are being explored, action is needed now
to address current reimbursement challenges
for novel antibiotics that undermine confidence
in R&D for future antibiotics. There are several
concrete actions national authorities can take
to address the economic challenges of antibiotic
R&D within existing systems: the development
of HTA processes to better capture the societal
value of antibiotics and reimbursement reform
to remove access barriers posed by bundled-payment mechanisms that discourage the appropriate use of novel antibiotics within hospitals due
to cost constraints. There is no “ideal” incentive
model and all models have their pros and cons;
the perfect should not be the enemy of the good.

Conclusions
AMR is on the rise while the pipeline of new and
innovative antibiotics is limited. Appropriate economic incentives are needed to stimulate antibiotic
R&D and encourage pharmaceutical innovation. It is
unlikely that a “one size fits all” solution will be the
way forward. Instead, different solutions are needed
depending on the type of antibiotic, the evolution of
64

resistance over time, likely use in clinical practice, and
the health care setting under consideration. Reforms
are also needed to eliminate access barriers associated with bundled payment mechanisms (DRGs) for
novel antibiotics that currently pose constraints on
hospital budgets when making appropriate treatment
decisions. In addition, HTA authorities must continue
the debate on how to fully capture the societal value
of novel antibiotics, which may not be adequately
captured within existing assessment framework. It
is important for policymakers, payers, and the medical community to collaborate in order to address the
current gaps in the market for antibiotics. This should
be done through the facilitation of legal, regulatory,
and funding processes as well as identifying pragmatic ways to implement appropriate solutions at the
local, regional and global levels. If governments can
create market conditions where there is a predictable
and sustainable return on investment, the pharmaceutical industry and private investors have demonstrated their willingness to take on the necessary risk
and uncertainty that comes with the development of
an approved medicine. These market conditions can
be created through both novel incentive mechanisms,
such as Market Entry Rewards, and reforms to existing mechanisms, such as reimbursement and health
technology assessment reform. Governments and policymakers should consider a wide range of incentives
and work with industry to implement them.
Note
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